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This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying 
to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This 
is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit 
performative such as ÒI promise that ΦÓ can count as an assertion of its content Φ. Second, I 
develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a given 
illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a 
promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker does not intend to Φ, or 
believes that he will not Φ, or both.  
In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of 
ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed 
definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge 
the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p 
directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to 
deceive the addressee into believing that p. 
 
Keywords: Speech	act	theory,	Insincerity,	Lying,	Promising,	Intentions 
 
 
Part A: A theory of lying by promising 
 
1.! The definition of lying 
 
According to a standard definition, lying is to state what you believe to be false with the 
intention of deceiving your audience into believing what you said2. More formally:  
  
Standard definition 
  
S lies to A about p iff:  
i) S states p  
ii) S believes ~p  
iii) S intends A to believe p  
  
In recent times, several philosophers have challenged this view, presenting some 
compelling counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition: lies under coercion 
(Siegler 1966:129, Carson 1988:511), lies to Ògo on the recordÓ, bald-faced lies (Carson 
																																																								
2
 See Mannison (1969:132), Kupfer (1982:134), Simpson (1992), Williams (2002: 96), Faulkner 
(2007; 2013), Meibauer (2005; 2014). 
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et al. 1982:17, Carson 2006:290, Sorensen 2007, Arico & Fallis 2013), and knowledge 
lies (Sorensen 2009). This has prompted many authors to drop (iii). 
However, rejecting (iii) comes at a price: a definition only featuring (i-ii) runs the risk 
of incorrectly ruling in fictional, ironical and metaphorical utterances. These are 
believed-false statements (i.e. they meet both condition (i) and (ii)), but are clearly not 
lies Condition (iii) correctly prevents the definition from counting these statements as 
lies. A putative alternative definition that rejects (iii) needs some alternative condition 
to play its role in ruling out these cases.  
A common way to respond to this challenge is to endorse an Ôassertion-basedÕ account 
of lying. The intuition behind this view is that the Ôstatement conditionÕ of the standard 
definition can be narrowed down, to require that the speaker genuinely assert the 
proposition that he believes to be false. Formally:  
  
Assertion-based definition  
 
S lies to A about p iff:  
i*) S asserts p  
ii) S believes ~p  
  
The assertion condition (i*) correctly rules out cases of fiction, irony and the like, that 
are not genuinely asserted. This definition still allows (and its proponents generally 
recognise) that intending to deceive is a feature that most lies have (or a Ôprototypical 
featureÕ of lies, as shown in Coleman & Kay 1981). This alternative view traces back to 
St. Thomas: ÒThe desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its 
species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its causeÓ, and has attracted a 
strong consensus in the last ten years3. 
An assertion-based definition can be further strengthened by requiring that also (iii) is 
satisfied, and some proponents of the intention to deceive condition endorse an 
assertion-based version of the standard view, in which both (iii) and (i*)4 are required 
																																																								
3
 Carson (2006; 2010), Sorensen (2007; 2009), Fallis (2009; 2012; 2014), Saul (2012), Stokke 
(2013). Except for Sorensen, all these authors spell out the assertion condition differently to 
(1*), specifying under which conditions a speakerÕs statement is a genuine assertion. 
4
 Chisholm and Feehan (1977), Simpson (1992), Williams (2002), Faulkner (2007), Meibauer 
(2005; 2014). Most of these authors identify the assertion condition with the intention to 
deceive condition Ð they believe that asserting p requires intending that your audience believes 
that p. For them, meeting (i*) entails meeting (iii), so that calling these views Ôassertion-basedÕ 
is taxonomically misleading, as they hardly depart from the standard view. Moreover, these 
views are highly controversial, as the idea that asserting p requires intending your audience to 
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for lying. Overall, there is a general consensus that condition (i*) and (ii) are necessary 
for lying, the core of the disagreement being on whether (iii) should be added as a 
further requirement. The present paper does not take a side on this dispute: it will focus 
instead on how conditions (i/i*) and (ii) apply to illocutionary acts other than assertion. 
This is an under-investigated problem in the literature. According to the assertion-
condition (i*), only assertions can be lies; however, it seems that some illocutionary acts 
that are not assertions, under some conditions, can be lies. For instance, it seems that (1) 
and (2) can be lies if the speaker is insincere; by contrast, sentence (3) can be 
infelicitous in many ways, but under no circumstances it can be appropriately called a 
lie. 
 
(1)!I warn you that Gervasio has a gun 
(2)!I promise that I will clean the toilet 
(3)!I order you to clean the toilet 
 
The problem of which kinds of illocutionary acts other than assertions can count as lies 
is an open research problem for the definition of lying, that has been almost ignored in 
the literature (but cf. Leonard 1959, Falkenberg 1988, Meibauer 2014): this paper will 
take on the challenge, and extend the definition to other illocutionary acts. A theory of 
how the assertion-based definition applies to illocutionary acts other than assertion 
needs to show not only in which sense utterance like (1) and (2) satisfy the Ôassertion 
conditionÕ (i*), but also how the Ôinsincerity conditionÕ (ii) applies to them, as it is not 
clear under which conditions speech acts like warning or promising can be insincere.  
Some theorists reject the possibility of lying by promising, or by uttering illocutionary 
acts other than assertion. For instance, Meibauer (2014:76) claims that insincere 
promises and warnings should not be dubbed lies. Similarly, in the first of his celebrated 
William James Lectures, Austin (1962/1975:256) claims that promising to do something 
that you do not intend to do is Òperhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless 
wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatementÓ 6. This is because in uttering a sentence 
																																																																																																																																																																		
believe that p (or to believe that you believe that p) is nowadays regarded as indefensible 
(Searle 1969:42-9, Davis 1999, Alston 2000: 44-50, Green 2007: 75-82, Macfarlane 2011). 
6
 In the following lectures, Austin abandons his constative-performative distinction, endorsing a 
different view that would count instead an insincere utterance of (EP) as a lie (cf. section 2.1). 
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containing an explicit performative7 like (EP), one also always asserts something true, 
namely that one is promising that Φ. 
 
(EP) I (hereby) promise that Φ 
 
Mahon (2010:50ÕÕ) points out that while the prediction that promises cannot be lies is 
counterintuitive, it is entailed by all definitions in the literature, since it follows from 
endorsing either (i) or (i*). Let us call any version of the claim that only assertions are 
eligible to meet (i*) the Ôonly-assertionÕ view. 
 
ONLY-ASSERTION: Only assertions, and no other illocutionary acts, can count as lying 
 
In the next section, I will attempt to do justice to the opposite intuition that not only 
assertions, but also other illocutionary acts (such as promising) can be used to lie. I will 
then move on to discuss how the assertion-based definition can be revised to capture 
these cases, focusing on promising in particular. 
  
2.! Meeting the assertion-condition 
 
To provide a theory of how promises can satisfy the assertion condition, the first step is 
to explain how sentences containing explicit performatives like (EP) can satisfy the 
assertion condition in a meaningful way. 
In (EP), Φ indicates a propositional content (generally a future action of the speaker), 
and ÒpromiseÓ is an explicit performative verb. By focusing on sentences of the form 
(EP), I am restricting my attention to a particular subset of promises, namely explicit, 
direct promises. This is because indirect promises, and in particular promises that Φ 
performed indirectly by asserting that one will Φ (as in (IP)), can be easily treated 
within the traditional account of lying, and do not require any further explanation: they 
clearly satisfy (any version of) the assertion condition, so that they count as lies if the 
other conditions obtain. 
 
(IP) I will Φ 
																																																								
7
 The standard form of a performative sentence is ÒI (hereby) [Performative Verb] that ΦÓ. 
Performative sentences can take the first person plural, impersonal or passive forms, or can be 
embedded under complex construction; for our purposes, however, we can ignore these 
complications. 
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2.1. Explicit Performatives 
 
Broadly, one can identify two strands of theories of explicit performatives, descriptivist 
and non-descriptivist theories. On a descriptivist account8, performative sentences like 
(4) are direct assertions that a promise is being made, and under relevant circumstances 
they can license the inference that a further illocutionary act (in this case a promise with 
content (4*)) has been made. 
 
(4) I promise that (4*) [I will feed the walrus] 
 
Non-descriptivist accounts9 maintain instead that a sentence like (4) is uniquely a direct 
promise with content (4*), and that (4) is not an assertion, as it cannot be properly 
described as being true or false. 
At first glance, the non-descriptivists are in a better position than descriptivists to allow 
for lying with explicit performatives. Consider a sentence like (5), where the difference 
between the two accounts is even more blatant: 
 
(5) I assert that (5*) [I love pizza] 
 
Intuitively, a sentence like (5) can be used to lie: if I utter (5) and I donÕt love pizza (I 
believe (5*) to be false), I am clearly lying. This is exactly what the non-descriptivists 
account predicts: (5*) is the content of the primary speech act performed in uttering (5), 
and the explicit performative ÒI assert thatÓ merely serves the purpose of making the 
assertoric force explicit.  
According to the descriptivists, by contrast, in uttering (5) I simply assert (5): I assert 
that ÒI assert that I love pizzaÓ. Since by uttering (5) I make it the case that (5) is true, I 
cannot utter (5) insincerely, and hence I cannot lie in uttering it. Searle (1989) talks in 
this sense of a Ôself-guaranteeingÕ nature of performative sentences: Òperformative 
																																																								
8
 Hedenius (1963), Lewis (1970), Bach (1975), Ginet (1979) and Bach & Harnish (1979:¤10; 
1992), Green (2005). 
9
 Austin (1962/1975), Harris (1977), Searle & Vanderveken (1985), Searle (1989), Reimer 
(1995), Jary (2000). 
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utterances are self-guaranteeing in the sense that the speaker cannot be lying, insincere, 
or mistaken about the type of act being performedÓ 10.   
To allow for lying with explicit performatives, the descriptivists need to show that they 
can treat both (5) and (5*) as asserted. Some versions of descriptivism yield exactly this 
prediction: since the utterance of (5) generally licenses the audience to infer that also an 
assertion that (5*) has been made, in asserting (5) you generally succeed in making your 
audience realise your intention to also assert that (5*), so that you eventually assert both 
(5) and (5*) (cf. Bach & Harnish 1979: 208).  
However, on this interpretation (5*) is not explicitly or directly said, but rather 
indirectly asserted, i.e. implicated (some would describe it is a Ôgeneralised 
conversational implicatureÕ, as in Grice 1989). In other words, it is something that the 
hearer has to infer from the speakerÕs utterance.  But if (5*) is merely implicated it 
cannot qualify as lying, because lying requires explicitly (i.e. directly) saying something 
that you believe to be false, rather than implicating it11. Since the descriptivist view 
counts proposition like (5*) as implicated, it incorrectly characterises utterances like (5) 
as misleading rather than lying. 
All in all, the non-descriptivist view seems better suited to account for lying with 
explicit performatives. This is not to deny that there might be ways to cash out the 
descriptivist view so that it counts both (5) and (5*) are literal assertions12, overcoming 
the difficulties considered in this section. In what follows, however, I will maintain a 
neutral position on this latter respect, and adopt a non-descriptivist framework to 
characterise lying with performative utterances. 
 
2.3. Asserting by promising 
 
The non-descriptivist account is able to treat performative utterances like (5) (explicit 
assertions) as direct assertions of (5*). However, to account for lying by promising 
																																																								
10
 The argument from the self-guaranteeing nature of explicit performatives is a classic 
argument against descriptivism. To be sure, in some cases a speaker S can utter (5) even if it is 
false that ÒS asserted that S loves pizzaÓ, and S believes it to be false; for instance, if S utters (5) 
alone, just to practice English language. However, if lying requires meaning what you say, this 
kind of examples cannot help. Even if descriptivists can defend that (5) can be believed to be 
false, it is more difficult for them defend that its utterance can count as lying. 
11
 See Adler (1997), Saul (2011; 2012), Stokke (2013); an exception to this view being 
Meibauer (2005; 2014) 
12
 An example is Garca-CarpinteroÕs (2013) proposal, which is descriptivist in spirit, but counts 
(5) as a mere ÔlocutionÕ and (5*) as a direct assertion. 
7	
	
within an assertion-based view of lying, one also needs to show that the utterance of an 
explicit promise like (4) can count as an assertion of (4*). 
In this section, I want to show that Searle & VandervekenÕs (1985) non-descriptivist 
framework that can meet this challenge, and clarify how it allows for some illocutionary 
acts, including promises, to count as indirect assertions13.  
According to Searle & Vanderveken, the standard way for a speaker to successfully 
perform an illocutionary act F(p) is to utter a sentence that expresses literally that force 
and content: this is called a literal performance of that act. In this sense, (EP) is a literal 
performance of a promise. Literal performance is to be contrasted with two ways of 
performing a speech act non-literally. 
First, there are cases of non-literal performance determined by the fact that the 
performance of an illocutionary act entails the performance of another (1985:129-30). 
The performance of an illocutionary act F1(p) entails the performance of another 
illocutionary act F2(p) iff in the context of the utterance it is not possible for S to 
perform F1(p) without performing F2(p) Ð so that if S performs F1(p), S also performs 
F2(p). In this sense, the explicit promise (4) illocutionarily entails the assertion of (4*), 
since I cannot promise that I will feed the walrus without asserting that I will feed the 
walrus: 
 
(4) I promise that (4*) [I will feed the walrus] 
 
Second, there are non-literal performances of F2(p), that the speaker performs by way of 
performing another illocutionary act F1(p) that does entail F2(p), but in the performance 
of which he makes salient his reflexive intention (cf. Grice 1989, Bach & Harnish 1979) 
to make the hearer understand that he intends to perform F2(p) (either instead of, or in 
addition to, F1(p)). If the speaker does so and the conditions for the successful 
performance of F2(p) are met, then the speaker has indirectly performed F2(p). In this 
sense, uttering (6) generally amounts to implicating (6a): 
 
																																																								
13
 Some assertion-based accounts, like CarsonÕs (2006; 2010) and StokkeÕs (2013; 2014), could 
also allow for promises to count as lies if paired with a non-descriptivist account of explicit 
performatives. I have independent reasons to prefer a speech-act theoretic account, that I aim to 
explore in another paper. Shortly put, a speech-act theoretic view generalises more easily to 
other illocutionary acts, and incorporates a criterion to determine how the sincerity condition 
changes depending on the speech act performed (cf. section 3).  
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(6) I ate three bananas 
(6a) I did not eat more than three bananas 
 
This distinction identifies two different ways of indirectly asserting: entailment, that is 
compatible with satisfying the assertion-condition, and implicature, that is not 
compatible with it. Entailment does not rely on expecting some additional hearer 
inference about the speakerÕs communicative intention, and cannot be retracted. By 
contrast, an implicature relies on expecting some additional hearer inference about the 
speakerÕs communicative intention, and generally it can be retracted. I cannot promise 
(4) without asserting (4*), so that if I believe that I will not feed the walrus I am lying. 
By contrast, I can assert (6) without intending to imply (6a), so that if I actually ate six 
bananas, my utterance is perhaps deceptive and misleading, given that (6a) is false, but 
it is not a lie, because what I literally said, namely (6), is true.  
These examples clarify why the indirect performance via entailment is compatible with 
lying, while implicature is only compatible with misleading. Example (4-4*) also 
illustrates the sense in which a promise can entail an assertion in the sense specified, 
and consequently meet the Ôassertion conditionÕ (i*). It should be noted that this view 
could be generalised to other illocutionary acts, to determine which ones (under normal 
conditions) entertain this relation of illocutionary entailment with assertion, and which 
do not. However, I will need to leave this task aside for the moment14, and move on to 
discussing how the insincerity condition for lying apply to promises. 
 
3. Insincerity condition 
 
Under which conditions is a promise a lie? According to Ôassertion-basedÕ definitions, a 
speech act that satisfies the Ôassertion-conditionÕ (i*) is a lie only if it also meets the 
insincerity condition (ii), i.e. if its content (identified in a non-descriptivist fashion) is 
																																																								
14
 Searle & Vanderveken (1985:182-92) offer a more detailed explanation of what determines 
entailment, and list of the assertives that entail an assertion (cf. also Marsili 2015:¤3). Surely 
commissives (the class including both promising and swearing) can entail assertions, and clearly 
no directives (the class including commands and requests) can. The case of expressives and 
directives is more complicated, and I aim to discuss them in another paper. 
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believed to be false. Call this view, that is endorsed by virtually every author in the 
literature15, the Ôonly-beliefÕ view of the insincerity condition for lying.  
  
ONLY-BELIEF:  an utterance can be a lie only if its content is believed to be false 
  
In this section, I will challenge the only-belief view, and argue that the insincerity 
condition for lying needs to be expanded to other propositional attitudes (e.g. intentions, 
desires) if it is to account for illocutionary acts in general, and for promises in 
particular. In order to do so, I will first discuss what it is, in general, for a speech act to 
be sincere or insincere, and then apply this account to promises. 
 
3.1 Expressing attitudes and (in)sincerity 
 
It is a standard view in speech act theory that each illocutionary act expresses a 
distinctive propositional attitude (Searle 1969, Bach & Harnish 1979).  The distinct 
attitude expressed by a given illocutionary act is part of what identifies it as opposed to 
others, and it is generally taken to define the point or purpose of the actions that we 
perform in uttering it. In this sense we say that an assertion expresses a belief, that a 
promise expresses an intention, that asking someone for something expresses a desire. 
Philosophers and linguists have presented different taxonomies of illocutionary acts 
based, amongst other things, on the different psychological attitudes expressed by 
different (kinds of) illocutionary acts. Most authors would agree that the following 
characterisation is broadly correct: 
  
A-EX: If S asserts that p, S expresses the belief that p 
R-EX: If S asks for p, S expresses a desire for p 
P-EX: If S promises that p, S expresses the intention to do p 
  
There are several ways to flesh out what is meant by ÔexpressingÕ a psychological state. 
I will assume that expressing an attitude does not entail having that attitude, so that you 
can insincerely express an attitude that you do not have (but cf. Davis 2003: 25, Green 
2007:70-83). Following a hint by Davidson (1985:88, cf. Marušić 2012:13, Fallis 2013), 
																																																								
15
 There is agreement that the content must be believed to be false, but not that it must be 
identified in a non-descriptivist fashion. See Marsili (2014:156-162) for a review of accounts 
that depart from the only-belief view, imposing different constraints on belief.  
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one could say that for a speaker to express a psychological state is for the speaker to 
represent himself as being in that psychological state. 
On an orthodox account of sincerity16, the sincerity condition for uttering a given 
illocutionary act is that the speaker has the psychological attitude expressed by that act:  
  
SIN-SA: The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) that expresses the psychological state 
Ψ(p) is sincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is in Ψ(p)  
  
From the orthodox account of sincerity, a simple account of insincerity clearly follows: 
a speaker is insincere whenever he is not in the psychological state that is expressed by 
the illocutionary act performed: 
 
SA-INS:  The performance of an illocutionary act F(p) that expresses the psychological state 
Ψ(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p), S is not in Ψ(p)
 17
 
  
This gives us the following insincerity conditions for the three illocutionary acts we are 
considering as examples: 
 
A-INS: S asserts that p insincerely only if S does not believe that p 
R-INS: S asks for p insincerely only if S does not desire p 
P-INS: S promises that p insincerely only if S does not intend to p 
 
This account, however, fails to deal properly with graded attitudes. For instance, 
sometimes a speaker is only partially confident that the proposition that he has asserted 
is true: we say in this case that the speaker has a partial, rather than outright, belief in p. 
Now, suppose I utter (7) and I think that (7) is probably true: 
 
(7) J.L Borges is the author of The Invention of Morel 
																																																								
16
 This view has been defended, under different guises, by Hare (1952:13,19Ð20,168Ð99), Searle 
(1969:60, 64Ð8); Wright (1992:14), Moran (2005), Green (2007:70-83). The most prominent 
alternative account takes a speech act to be sincere if it is not aimed at deceiving, and insincere 
if it is (Williams 2002:74). Since this would conflate the insincerity condition with the intention 
to deceive condition, and lying with misleading, it is uninteresting for refining the definition of 
lying. Cf. Eriksson (2011) and Stokke (2014) for an overview. 
17
 Classic objections to the orthodox account of insincerity are cases self-deception (in which 
the speaker is mistaken about his own mental states, cf. Moran 2005, Eriksson 2011, Chan & 
Kakane 2011, Stokke 2014) and malapropism (in which the speaker is mistaken about what he 
said, cf. Reimer 2004, Sorensen 2011, Saul 2012:15-9). However, these challenges can be dealt 
with just by specifying that the speaker has to satisfy (any version of) the insincerity conditions 
for lying advertently (or by endorsing qualified definitions like SA-INS2). ÒAdvertentlyÓ in this 
case indicates that the speaker is aware of the divergence between the psychological attitude he 
expressed and the one he instantiates. 
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According to A-INS, in uttering (7) I am insincere, because I lack the full belief that I 
am expressing in asserting (7), and hence I am lying. However, asserting (7) while 
believing that it is probably true is in some relevant sense sincere, and clearly it does not 
amount to lying (but cf. Marušić 2012:8). To account for these cases, one can require 
that the speaker is more confident in p than he is in its negation (Marsili 2014; forth.): 
 
A-INS2: S asserts that p insincerely only if S is more confident in p than he is in not p 
 
This revision hardly applies to illocutionary acts that express psychological states other 
than beliefs, given that attitudes like intentions do not come in degrees. However, for 
any act involving gradable attitudes, SA-INS can be generalised just by specifying that 
insincerity with respect to psychological state Ψ(p) requires the speaker to be in Ψ(~p) 
more than he is in Ψ(p). 
 
SA-INS2:  The performance of F(p) is insincere IFF in uttering F(p) S takes himself to express 
that he is Ψ(p), but S takes himself to be in Ψ(~p) more than he is in Ψ(p) 
 
This gives us a general framework to understand how the insincerity conditions for 
lying might apply to illocutionary acts in general, and to promising in particular.  
 
3.2 Insincerity conditions for promising 
 
So far, we have encountered two competing ways of accounting for the insincerity 
conditions for lying by promising. The first (section 1) is the approach traditionally used 
to define lying: the only-belief account. This approach applies indifferently the same 
insincerity conditions to every speech act that satisfies the Ôstatement conditionÕ, and 
counts them as insincere whenever their content is believed to be false. 
The second is the speech act theoretic account considered in the previous section: (i) a 
promise expresses an intention to Φ, and consequently (ii) the insincerity condition for 
promising is intending not to Φ. Assumption (i) can be traced back to HumeÕs view 
(THN: 517-19) that a promise always expresses (and communicates) an intention to 
perform the promised act18. Assumption (ii) is found in foundational works of speech 
																																																								
18
 This view is extremely influential in the philosophical literature on the nature of social 
obligations. Many authors (sometimes referred to as Ôinformation-interestÕ theorist) take 
promisingÕs main function to be informing the promisee of what the promisor is going to do 
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act theory, like those of Austin (1962/1975:50, 135-6) and Searle (1965:243, 1969:60-
2). I will refer to this account as the only-intention account. On this view a promise is 
insincere only if, at the time of the utterance, the speaker does not intend to perform. 
A third account of the insincerity conditions for promising can be derived from the 
relation of entailment between asserting and promising that outlined in 2.3. If one 
cannot promise to Φ without also performing an assertion that one will Φ, every time 
one promises to Φ one also asserts that one will Φ. And if an assertion is thus performed 
in addition to the promise, the sincerity conditions for asserting need to be satisfied too, 
i.e. performing the act sincerely also requires one to believe that one will Φ. This yields 
a novel account of the insincerity conditions for promising: 
 
Entailed-Insincerity condition:  
A promise is insincere if speaker intends not to Φ, or if the speaker believes that he will not Φ, 
or both 
 
More specifically, promise is insincere qua promise if the speaker intends not to Φ, and 
insincere qua assertion if the speaker believes that he will not Φ. This view (be it 
correct or not) can clearly be generalised: whenever there is illocutionary entailment, 
and two illocutionary acts are performed, the sincerity conditions of both acts apply.  
To sum up, the three candidate insincerity conditions for lying by promising are: 
 
(BIC): Belief insincerity condition: S believes that S will not Φ 
(IIC): Intention insincerity condition: S intends not to Φ 
(EIC): Entailed insincerity condition: BIC ԧ IIC 
 
Which account is preferable? The Moorean test for insincerity provides some linguistic 
data that prima facie favours the entailed-insincerity view over the other two. It is well 
known that assertions followed by the negation of their sincerity condition give rise to 
Moorean absurdities (Moore 1993:210): asserting Òp and I donÕt believe itÓ is 
incoherent in some distinctive way. One way of explaining this incoherence is that in 
uttering these sentences, the speaker performs a speech act and then blatantly violates 
one condition for its felicitous (in this case, sincere) performance, eventually failing to 
assert that p (Vanderveken 1980, Searle and Vanderveken 1985:150,152). If both BIC 
																																																																																																																																																																		
(Sidgwick 1981:442Ð44, Anscombe 1981:18, Rawls 1981:345, Fried 1981:16, Foot 2011:45). 
This view has been opposed by Owens (2008:747-51). His arguments seem successful in 
establishing that in promising to Φ one does not necessarily communicates an intention to Φ, 
but it is less clear that they demonstrate that in promising to Φ one does not necessarily 
expresses an intention to Φ, or that sincerely promising does not require intending to Φ. 
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and IIC are insincerity conditions for promising, it seems that they should both give rise 
to the same kind of unsuccessful incoherence (cf.	Marušić 2012:14). As a matter of fact, 
sentences like (8~B) and (8~I) display this kind of absurdity: 
 
(8~B) I promise that I will pick you up at 6, but I donÕt believe I will pick you up at 6 # 
(8~I) I promise that I will pick you up at 6, but I donÕt intend to pick you up at 6 # 
 
In both cases, the utterance strikes one as incoherent, and in both cases, it is difficult to 
imagine that the speaker will be taken to have promised to pick his interlocutor up at 6. 
This linguistic data supports EIC, and cannot be easily explained by BIC or IIC taken 
separately. 
One might still wonder whether endorsing EIC actually makes a difference, rather than 
simply introducing needless complications. If in the vast majority of cases oneÕs 
intention to Φ is accompanied by the belief that one will Φ (and vice versa), requiring 
both is redundant. However, as Marušić (2013:293) correctly points out, we utter 
promises where intentions and beliefs come apart all the time. We often promise Òto 
exercise more, to get out of debt, to quit smoking, to learn a foreign language, or to 
spend the rest of our life with our spouseÓ in situations in which we both intend to stick 
to the promise and believe that we will probably end up violating it.  
To see how this relates to lying, consider the following example: a mechanic utters (9) 
and both intends to do his best to repair the car and believes that the damage is so 
serious he will almost certainly fail: 
 
(9) I promise that I will repair your car by next week 
 
The mechanic says what he believes to be almost certainly false: intuitively, (9) is a lie 
(cf. A-INS2). The only-intention view is not able to track this intuition; the entailed-
insincerity view, by contrast, correctly predicts that (9) is a lie. 
Arguably, cases like (9) are not straightforward, or prototypical, cases of lying. But this 
is also a prediction of the entailed-insincerity account: (9) is insincere qua assertion, but 
not insincere qua promise. The mechanic intends to fulfil the promise, following one 
sincerity condition, but he believes he will almost surely fail, violating the other. In Part 
B, I consider a complementary case (a promise satisfying BIC but not IIC), and report 
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empirical evidence showing that native English speakers judge that both kinds of 
violation are lies. 
All in all, it seems that there are solid reasons to prefer the entailed-insincerity account 
of promising. So far, only Marušić (2013) has defended a similar view (Austin 
1961/2003:239 merely hints at this idea). However, Marušić also suggests that a 
promise that violates BIC but not IIC might be better described as irrational rather than 
insincere. This is true if one endorses a Ôcognitivist viewÕ (cf. Appendix II), contending 
that it is irrational to intend to do something you believe that you will not do, so that 
only utterances satisfying both BIC and IIC (or neither of them) are rational, while 
utterances like (9) are irrational rather than insincere. 
MarušićÕs observation points out a possible problem for the proposed account: if a 
rational intention to Φ requires believing that one will Φ, then there is no need to 
require both IIC and BIC, as the satisfaction of the first entails the satisfaction of the 
second in every case in which the speaker is rational. If readers have this sort of worry, 
they can refer to Appendix II: there I argue, against the cognitivist view, that (as long as 
you take it as a live possibility that you will Φ Ð i.e. as long as you are not certain that 
you will not Φ) you can rationally intend to Φ and believe that you will very likely not 
Φ (or vice versa). On this weak cognitivist view, MarušićÕs observation is not a worry: 
utterances like (9) are insincere rather than irrational, and EIC is preferable to the other 
accounts exactly because it successfully captures these peculiar forms of insincerity. 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
According to the proposed account, promising entails asserting, and the utterance of a 
promise is insincere when the belief insincerity condition (BIC) or the intention 
insincerity condition (IIC) or both are satisfied. Violations of both are standard cases of 
insincerity, while violations of a single one result in less severe cases of insincerity. 
Plugging this view into the assertion-based definition of lying, we obtain the following 
definition: 
 
Definition of lying by promising 
In promising that p, S lies to A iff:  
1.!S successfully promises that p 
2.!BIC ԧ IIC 
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This account can be extended to any illocutionary act, thanks to the account of the 
assertion-condition and of the insincerity-conditions developed in the previous sections. 
 
Definition of lying by F(p)-ing 
Where F(p) is an illocutionary act with content p that expresses a psychological state Ψ(p) and 
illocutionarily entails an assertion that p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1.!S successfully performs F(p) 
2.!BIC ԧ SΨ(~p) 
 
In order to develop and defend my account, I have often appealed to intuitions, claiming 
that its predictions are consistent with intuitions about lying, and attacking alternative 
views as failing to track such intuitions. In the next section, I present an experimental 
study that tests this hypothesis. It shows that the intuitions of native English speakers 
indeed support the proposed account, and that they are incompatible with all the 
alternative ones: the only-assertion, only-belief, and only-intention accounts, and the 
cognitivist view of intentions and beliefs. 
 
 
Part B Ð An experimental investigation about lying by promising
20
  
 
4.1!Testing folk intuitions about lying 
 
In the philosophical literature, it is generally agreed that a good definition of lying 
should track the ordinary usage of the term (Carson 2006:285; Fallis 2009:32): most 
debaters are after a characterisation of lying that is in line with the linguistic practice of 
competent speakers. A good account of lying should predict which usages of the term 
are correct and incorrect according to competent speakers. A corollary of this way of 
thinking is that if an account of lying makes predictions that are inconsistent with 
ordinary peopleÕs intuitions, that account fails to meet one important desideratum of a 
theory of lying. With this in mind, philosophers and linguists have started to accumulate 
data about ordinary speakersÕ intuitions about the correct usage of the term. These 
																																																								
20
 The experimental part of this study has been conducted in collaboration with Miklos Kurthy 
of the Experimental Philosophy Group at the University of Sheffield. Kurthy is responsible for 
all the statistical analysis, and in general for providing support in designing the experiment and 
in collecting and analysing the data. 
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studies have the potential of giving us insight into what lying is, or at the very least into 
what lying is perceived to be within a community of speakers21. 
Numerous and diverse empirical studies, stemming from different theoretical 
backgrounds and motivated by different explanatory aims, have attempted to explore 
folk intuitions about lying22. Among the ones explicitly investigating the intuitions of 
competent speakers about the concept of lying, the most important strand comes from 
the framework of prototype semantics. Following the lead of Coleman & Kay (1981), 
these studies attempt to identify the features of a prototypical lie, and to outline the 
differences of these prototypes across different cultures (Sweetster 1987, Cole 1996, 
Hardin 2010, Rong, Chunmei & Lin 2013). The present study addresses similar worries, 
but in a slightly different framework, namely that of experimental philosophy. Here, the 
aim of the analysis is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an utterance 
to be a lie, rather than the prototypical features that make up the concept. Only three 
studies on lying have been conducted within this framework so far (Arico & Fallis 
2013, Turri & Turri 2015, Wiegmann et al. 2016), the first one attempting to test if the 
intention to deceive is necessary for lying, and the second two if actual falsity is. The 
present experimental study will instead try to establish which conditions are necessary 
for lying by promising. 
 
4.2!Aim of the study 
 
This experimental study aims to test the theories developed in the first part of the paper 
against the intuitions of native English speakers. This means that it will attempt to 
determine: 
 
(a) If ordinary people rate some insincere promises as lies, and 
(b) Which insincerity conditions have to be satisfied for them to do so 
 
As a reminder, the candidate insincerity conditions are four combinations of BIC and 
IIC: only BIC, only IIC, (BIC & IIC), and (BIC ԧ IIC).  
 
																																																								
21
 For a more detailed defence of the importance of tracking ordinary intuitions for a definition 
of lying, see Fallis (2009) and Arico & Fallis (2012:794-7) 
22
 Here I am only considering studies on competent speakers. For a broader a review, including 
studies in developmental psychology, see Hardin (forth.). 
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IIC: the speaker does not intend to	Φ 
BIC: the speaker does not believe that he will Φ 
 
Testing (a) is relatively simple: it is sufficient to create a story in which it seems that a 
character lies by promising, and ask participants whether the character has lied. Testing 
(b) is a slightly more complex matter. Here we need different stories in which different 
combinations of insincerity conditions are violated, and for each story test whether the 
participants believe that the speaker has lied. Given our candidate insincerity conditions, 
we will need to consider three scenarios in which a character promises something 
insincerely. In the straightforward scenario, the characterÕs (S) utterance satisfies both 
BIC and IIC. In the no-intention scenario, it satisfies IIC but not BIC. In the no-belief 
scenario, it satisfies BIC but not IIC. I will refer to the latter two cases as the crucial 
conditions, as opposed to the control (straightforward) conditions. 
 
¥ Straightforward scenario: BIC & IIC [CONTROL] 
¥ No-intention scenario: IIC & ~BIC  [CRUCIAL] 
¥ No-belief scenario: BIC & ~IIC [CRUCIAL] 
 
4.3!The predictions of existing theories 
 
In the first section of the paper, I have mentioned five approaches to lying by explicit 
promising. Each accounts gives different predictions about which of the three scenarios 
will be rated as a lie. 
 
1.! According to the only-assertion paradigm (∅), lying requires a direct assertion, 
therefore explicit promises cannot count as lies. Giving a negative response to (a), this 
account simply dodges question (b): there is no Ôinsincerity conditionÕ for lying by 
promising, because one cannot lie by explicitly promising. Its prediction is that 
respondents will claim that in no scenario the character is lying. 
2.! The only-belief paradigm (BIC) rigidly assumes that you lie only if you believe that 
the propositional content of your speech act is false. This view expects positive 
responses in the straightforward and in the no-belief condition, but negative responses 
in the no-intention condition. 
3.! The only-intention paradigm (IIC) maintains that a promise is insincere iff the speaker 
does not intend to fulfil his promise. Applied to lying, this view predicts that a promise 
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is a lie iff the speaker does not intend to fulfil it. The straightforward and no-intention 
cases should then be rated as lies, but not the no-belief case.  
4.! According to a cognitivist interpretation (BIC & IIC), the no-intention and no-belief 
should be described as cases of irrational thinking rather than lying, so that only the 
straightforward case should be rated as a lie. 
5.! According to the entailed-assertion paradigm (BIC ԧ IIC), a promise is a lie either if 
the speaker does not intend to fulfil his obligation, or if he believes that he will fail to 
fulfil it, or both. The account also predicts that all scenarios will be rated as lies, but 
expects the straightforward one to receive slightly higher ratings than the crucial ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Straightforward  NO INT NO BEL 
Only-assertion NO NO NO 
Only-belief YES NO YES 
Only-intention YES YES NO 
Cognitivist YES NO (IRR) NO (IRR) 
Entailed-assertion  YES YES (-) YES (-) 
 
Table 1: the predictions of the five different accounts of lying by promising 
 
4.4! Experiment 1 
 
4.4.1! Method 
Participants: Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested 
using Qualtrics. They were compensated $0.2 for taking the survey. Repeated 
participation was prevented. Overall, 166 U.S. residents were tested (85 females; mean 
age (SD) = 36.6 years (12.9); range: 18Ð72; 100% reporting English as a native 
language). To prevent participants from taking the test negligently, a minimum response 
time (25 seconds) and a control question were set. Data from three participants who 
failed to meet these conditions were excluded, but including them would not affect the 
results. 
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Design: Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Each 
condition features Coco and Baba, and in each condition Coco promises something to 
Baba. The first two conditions [(1) straightforward lie; (2) no intention] belong to the 
ÔdrinkÕ story, and the second two conditions [(3) straightforward lie; (4) no belief] 
belong to the ÔrepairÕ story. In the ÔdrinkÕ story, Coco promises not to drink; in the 
ÔrepairÕ story, Coco promises to repair Baba's car. For each pair, in the straightforward 
condition Coco lacks both intention and belief, and in the crucial case he lacks one 
attitude (intention in 2, belief in 4) but not the other. 
Having been assigned to one of the conditions and having read the relevant story, the 
participants were posed two questions, always in the same order. The first asked 
whether Coco told a lie (ÒDid Coco tell a lieÓ? Y/N). The second allowed participants to 
report whether they felt uneasy in answering the preceding question (ÒDid you find it 
easy to make a decisionÓ? Y/N); those answering ÒnoÓ were solicited to motivate their 
uneasiness via a simple feedback form. The second question was especially designed to 
rule out the possibility that participants would have preferred not to give a dichotomic 
yes-no response, but also to collect qualitative data about the strength of the 
participants' intuitions. 
Some peculiarities of the design are due to consistency constraints on the rationality of 
Òintending without believingÓ, and vice versa (cf. Appendix II). The first peculiarity is 
that in all conditions Coco has a partial rather than outright belief in whether he will 
fulfil his promise. This is due to the adoption of weak cognitivism in this research, 
according to which intending to Φ entails not being certain that you will fail to Φ. To 
grant uniformity between all conditions, Coco has a partial belief both in the crucial 
cases (where it could not be otherwise) and in the straightforward ones.  Similar 
consistency constraints (also discussed in Appendix II) motivated one asymmetry in the 
experimental design, i.e. the fact that the no-intention and no-belief cases were not 
tested within the same story. The reason is that an uncontroversial no-intention case 
demands a promise about refraining from acting, while an uncontroversial no-belief 
case demands a promise about actively performing one action. 
  
4.4.2! Results and discussion 
Virtually every respondent rated the straightforward cases (in which Coco lacks both 
belief and intention to perform) as lies: 95% of the participants claimed that Coco lied 
in the drink-straightforward condition (38 of 40) and 95% in the repair-straightforward 
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condition (39 of 41). All except one participant (in the drink scenario) declared that the 
question was easy to answer. The results for the straightforward cases support the view 
that it is possible to lie by explicit promising, refuting the only assertion hypothesis. 
They also back the stronger claim that insincere promises can be regarded as 
prototypical cases of lying; and that, more generally, a prototypical lie can be performed 
by uttering a speech act other than assertion. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents rating the protagonistÕs utterance as a lie in each condition.  
 
In the no-intention condition, 90% of the participants (40 of 44) rated the promise as a 
lie. This refutes the predictions of the only-belief and of the cognitivist accounts, as 
respondents classed the promise as a lie even if Coco sincerely believes that he will 
(almost certainly) fulfil his promise. The difference between this condition and the 
corresponding drink-straightforward case was not significant, χ2(1, N = 84) = .53, p = 
.467; nonetheless, as much as 14% of the participants (6 of 44) declared that the 
question was not easy to answer, which is significantly more than in the straightforward 
conditions (Fisher's Exact Test, N = 125, p = .008, two tails).  This shows that intuitions 
in this condition are not as strong as in the straightforward cases, and suggests that the 
no-intention condition is regarded by some participants as a non-paradigmatic instance 
of lying.  
The no-belief condition was rated as a lie by 73% of the participants (30 of 41). A 
binomial test showed that this result is significantly different to a chance distribution of 
the responses (p = .004, two tails); in other words, participants were more likely to say 
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that the promise was a lie than the opposite (OR = 2.73), which logically entails that the 
only-intention account (according to which this case does not qualify as lying) can also 
be rejected. In this condition, 15% of the participants (6 of 41) declared that the 
question was difficult to answer: FisherÕs Exact Test revealed that this was significantly 
different to the straightforward cases (p = .006, two tails, OR = 13.71), suggesting that 
at least some participants did not see this as a paradigmatic case of lying. That the case 
might not be seen as prototypical is also confirmed by the lower percentage of ratings of 
the promise as a lie: this case differs significantly from all the rest of the cases jointly, 
χ
2(1, N = 166) = 12.71, p = .001, as well as from the no-intention case separately, χ2(1, 
N = 85) = 4.6, p = .032. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents rating the question as difficult to answer (scale from 0% to 50%). 
 
Interestingly, none of the feedback forms filled in by the participants who found it 
difficult to answer the question mentions the contrast between intention and belief as 
problematic, suggesting that the cognitivist account of intentions does not reflect the 
participantsÕ intuition. Logistic regression was used to test whether information about 
gender or age could be used to predict the responses, revealing that neither gender (p = 
.592) nor age (p = .808) was a significant predictor.  
The results provide strong support for the definition of lying by promising elaborated in 
part A. However, one can still worry that the dichotomous yes/no design led some 
participants to polarize their responses in an unnatural way (cf. Xu, Lu, Fuo & Lee 
2009:318, Turri & Turri 2015:163). In section 3 we have seen that beliefs, and hence 
22	
	
insincerity, can come in degrees, and that contrasting parameters can influence our 
evaluation of a statement as insincere. Perhaps participants see lying as a scalar or 
vague concept (cf. Bazzanella 2009, Marsili 2014; forth.), and would have preferred to 
give a graded answer. In fact, 14% of the participants in the crucial cases (12 of 85) 
declared that the question was difficult to answer.  Maybe they gave a positive answer 
to sanction that the speaker misbehaved in some important way Ð but they would not 
have classed the utterance as a lie if an intermediate alternative was given. If this line of 
reasoning is correct, and the probes forced the participants to polarise their responses, 
the proposed interpretation might be mistaken. To test this hypothesis, the test was 
rerun with a slightly modified design that allowed for graded rather than dichotomous 
responses. 
 
4.5! Experiment 2 
 
4.5.1! Method 
Participants: Participants were 104 adults (57 females; mean age (SD) = 37.1 years 
(11.8); range: 19-64; 100% reporting English as a native language, recruited and tested 
online as in Experiment 1). One participant failing to meet the minimum response time 
was excluded, but including him would have not affected the results. 
Design: The design was the same as Experiment 1, but instead of using a dichotomous 
yes/no measure, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the statement 
ÒCoco told Baba a lieÓ on a 7-point Likert scale (1: Òdefinitely agreeÓ, 4: Òneither agree 
nor disagreeÓ, 7: Òdefinitely disagreeÓ). If people had the intuition that the crucial 
conditions do not fully qualify as cases of lying, their ratings should concentrate around 
the midpoint (or below); if instead they shared the intuition that Coco is actually lying, 
the ratings should instead concentrate on the ÔlieÕ end of the scale (5 or above).  
 
4.5.2 Results and discussion 
In the no-intention condition, participants overwhelmingly agreed that Coco did lie: 
84% (21 out of 25) of them rated it as Ò5Ó or above, and only 16% (4 participants) as 
Ò4Ó or below (mean = 6.0; mode = Ò7Ó). Similarly, in the no-belief condition, 
participants overwhelmingly agreed that Coco did lie, 88% (22 out of 25) of them rating 
it as Ò5Ó or above and the remaining 12% (3 participants) rating it below Ò4Ó (mean = 
5.8; mode = Ò7Ó). Like in the first experiment, the mean score in the Ôrepair beliefÕ 
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condition was slightly lower than in the Ôdrink intentionÕ condition, but the difference 
(unlike in Experiment 1) was not significant, t(48) = 0.64, p = .523.  A comparison of 
the crucial and the straightforward cases revealed a significant difference between the 
two ÔrepairÕ scenarios, t(34.3) = 2.52, p = .017 (equal variances not assumed), but no 
significant difference between the two ÔdrinkÕ scenarios, t(49) = 0.58, p = .56223. 
Overall, these results are well in accordance with those obtained with the dichotomous 
design, strengthening the case for the entailed-assertion account.	
 
Tab. 2: Pie charts showing the participantsÕ ratings in each of the four scenarios. 
 
A last worry to address is that participants might have agreed that Coco lied only 
because they were not allowed to categorise his statement in some alternative way that 
they found more adequate. Perhaps most had the intuition that in the crucial conditions 
Coco was deceptive, or insincere, and were led to describe him as lying only because no 
other category of assessment was offered. They agreed that Coco was lying because it 
was the only available option to express that he misbehaved, but they would have 
denied it if some alternative category more adequate to describe the situation, like being 
deceptive, was also available. To address this worry, a second study was conducted that 
provided participants with an opportunity to describe the speaker along two different 
categories: as being deceptive and as being lying24. 
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 Note, however, that this comparison may have been somewhat distorted by the fact that 
the control drink scenario got lower scores than expected from a straightforward case. 
24
 What if the participants preferred to describe the utterance as insincere rather than deceptive? 
There is a reason why ÒdeceptiveÓ was preferred to ÒinsincereÓ. On all plausible understandings 
of these terms, being insincere entails being deceptive, while the opposite is not true.  The 
ÒdeceptionÓ option is thus preferable, as it allows all participants to acknowledge that the 
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4.6! Experiment 3 
 
4.6.1 Method 
Participants: Fifty-five new participants were tested (31 females, mean age (SD) = 
34.6 years (12.5); range: 19Ð66; 100% reporting English as a native language, recruited 
and tested online as in the other experiments). Data from six participants failing to meet 
the minimum response time and/or the control question was excluded, but including 
them would have not affected the results. 
Design: Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two crucial conditions (no-
belief, no-intention) from Experiment 1. They were then asked to answer two questions 
that appeared (in randomized order) on the same screen: 
 
¥! Did Coco say something deceptive? [Y/N] 
¥! Did Coco tell Baba a lie? [Y/N] 
 
Participants were then asked to answer the same control and demographic questions as 
in Experiment 1. 
In both of the vignettes used in the experiment, there is no question that CocoÕs 
statement is deceptive: in the no-belief condition he pretends to have a belief he does 
not have; in the no-intention one, he pretends to have an intention that he does not have. 
Participants who had the intuition that Coco was not lying thus had the opportunity to 
deny that Coco is lying while being able to describe Coco as misbehaving, namely as 
being deceptive. 
Given that in both vignettes it is uncontroversial that CocoÕs statement is deceptive, it is 
only the second question (about lying) that is of interest here. If the scores obtained in 
this experiment are significantly lower than those obtained in the same scenarios of 
Experiment 1, then the proposed interpretation of the results might be unwarranted. By 
contrast, if participants continue to describe Coco as lying, there is even stronger 
experimental evidence in favour of the proposed view.  
 
4.6.2. Results 
																																																																																																																																																																		
protagonist misbehaved also if they think that ÒinsincereÓ is a more accurate description 
(agreeing that the protagonist is insincere entails agreeing that he is deceptive). 
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The overwhelming majority of participants marked both the no-intention case (92%, 24 
out of 26) and the no-belief case (90%, 26 out of 29) as a lie. The scores obtained in the 
crucial conditions in Experiment 3 are even higher than those obtained in Experiment 1, 
but neither of the across-experiment differences was significant (no-intention: χ2(1, N = 
70) = 2.89, p = .089.; no-belief: χ2(1, N = 70) = .04, p = .84). These results are 
consistent with the previous ones, and strengthen the case for the entailed-assertion 
view. Somewhat surprisingly, the difference between the no-belief and the no-intention 
condition found in the previous experiments has disappeared, χ2(1, N = 55) = .12, p = 
.73.   
 
Figure 3: Percentage of respondents rating the protagonistÕs utterance as a lie and as deceptive. 
 
4.7 General discussion 
 
The results of all experiments strongly support the entailed-assertion account. They 
consistently show that it offers the best predictions of peopleÕs intuitions about lying by 
promising. A promise is a lie iff the speaker lacks belief or intention to fulfil the 
promise, or both. Furthermore, these results undermine all alternative views: the only-
assertion view that only assertions can count as lies, the only-belief view that believing 
that what you say is false is necessary for lying, and the only-intention view that a 
promise is a lie only if the speaker does not intend to perform.  
In Experiment 1 and 2, the crucial conditions obtained lower scores than the control 
conditions (Experiment 3 had no control conditions), and in Experiment 1 around one in 
six participants declared that they found it difficult to decide whether to classify them as 
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lies. In line with the prediction of the entailed-assertion view, this suggests that the 
consensus is less pronounced when only one of the two sincerity conditions for 
promising is violated, and that a portion of the the population sees them as non-
paradigmatic instances of lying. 
 
5! More on the results 
 
5.1 Intentions vs Beliefs 
 
The crucial conditions got different results in Experiment 1: the no-intention condition 
got significantly higher rates than the no-belief one. A slighter difference between them 
was also found in Experiment 2. This kind of difference, however, was not found in 
Experiment 3, or in the second question of Experiment 1 (about the participantsÕ 
uneasiness to define CocoÕs utterance as a lie). Perhaps the difference is due to random 
fluctuations in the subjectsÕ intuitions, and does not require an explanation. But if an 
explanation must be given, it can be given in terms of moral judgements. 
Several authors have suggested that lying is a morally loaded term (Bok 1978:14, 
Williams 1985:140), and some of them even contended that white lies are not lies 
(Margolis 1962, Donagan 1977:89, Grotius, RWP:1212-8). A plausible view is that 
moral judgements might affect whether one finds a particular case of lying more or less 
prototypical. Experimental studies have also shown that judgements about intentions 
(Knobe, 2003) and causation (Alicke 2014) can be influenced by judgements about 
culpability (i.e. moral judgements). If moral judgements can affect folk intuitions about 
whether a particular case is a lie, a moral asymmetry between the scenarios might have 
influenced the results. In fact, there is such an asymmetry between the no-intention and 
the no-belief cases. In the first case, Coco is fully responsible for not fulfilling the 
promise: it is in his power to fulfil it, but he willingly decides to infringe it. By contrast, 
in the no-belief case Coco intends to do what is in his power to fulfil the promise, but it 
is not fully in his power to do so. In other words, in the first case he is fully responsible 
for the infraction, while in the second he is only responsible for having set the stakes too 
high. 
While the no-intention case is by definition in Ôbad faithÕ, the no-belief case is by 
definition in Ôgood faithÕ. This could explain the slight asymmetry in the results Ð an 
asymmetry also expected in any replication of the test, given that it is built into the 
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difference between violating the Ôbelief sincerity conditionÕ and violating the Ôintention 
sincerity conditionÕ. 
 
5.2 The intent to deceive condition 
 
Proponents of the intention to deceive condition (IDC) for lying (cf. section 1) might be 
worried that these results have been influenced by the fact that it has been left 
unspecified whether Coco intends to deceive Baba. For instance, the no-belief case 
might have received lower results in Experiment 1 because it is not clear whether Coco 
intends to deceive Baba. In this section, I will show not only that this worry is 
unfounded, but that the results undermine the very idea that ordinary speakers take the 
IDC to be necessary for lying. 
On a standard interpretation, the IDC has to be the content of the statement: if the 
content of the statement is p, the speaker has to intend to make the hearer believe that p. 
On a weaker version of the IDC, the relevant intention is just to make the hearer believe 
that the speaker believes that p. In other words, where p is the believed-false content of 
the speakerÕs statement, these are the two versions of IDC: 
 
IDC1: S intends A to believe: (p) 
IDC2: S intends A to believe: (S believes that p) 
 
In the no-belief condition, the content of the promise is that Coco will repair the car, a 
proposition that Coco believes to be very likely false. Now, unless Coco intends his 
promise not to be accepted, or not to be acted upon (i.e. if CocoÕs promise is a normal 
promise), Coco clearly intends Baba to believe that he will repair the car, so the 
participants have no reason to believe that IDC does not obtain. 
In the no-intention condition, by contrast, the relevant content is that Coco will not 
drink. But here Coco believes the proposition to be probably true, so that neither IDC1 
nor IDC2 can obtain, and the participants cannot think that they obtain. Two 
consequences can be drawn from this observation. The first one is that intuitions about 
the intention to deceive condition did not alter the result of the experiment: if they had 
some weight, they would have favoured the no-belief case over the no-intention one; 
instead, it was the latter that obtained significantly higher results. The second is that the 
high results from the no-intention case (90% lies, showing no significant difference 
from the straightforward cases) strongly suggest that neither IDC1 nor IDC2 is 
perceived as a necessary condition for lying.  
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Here is a reply. Even if neither IDC1 nor IDC2 are satisfied in the no-intention case, 
Coco is still aiming to deceive, since he clearly intends Baba to believe that he intends 
not to drink. The problem with this response is that it relies on a problematic definition 
of Ôintention to deceiveÕ, according to which there are no constraints on what the 
deception is about: 
 
IDC3: S intends to deceive A 
 
However, IDC3 is untenable, because it counts any deceptive believed-false statement 
as a lie, even if deception has nothing to do with the content of the statement. It seems 
that the IDC should instead only capture deceptive intents that are somehow related to 
what is said by the liar. Fallis (2010:6) offers a convincing example of the 
counterintuitive consequences of endorsing IDC3: ÒSuppose that I say in a theatrical 
tone ÒI am the Prince of DenmarkÓ in order to convince my new acquaintance that I am 
an actor (rather than that I am royalty). Although I have said something that I believe to 
be false with the intent to deceive, I have not liedÓ. 
To be able to defend the claim that Coco is lying in the no-belief case, the proponent of 
the IDC has to provide a different version of the IDC Ð perhaps one that is sensitive to 
the different attitudes expressed by a speech act, such as IDC4: 
 
IDC4: S intends A to believe that (S Ψ(p)), 
 
where Ψ is the propositional attitude expressed by the illocutionary act with content p 
that S has performed. 
To conclude, the experiment represents a challenge to the existing versions of the IDC, 
and suggests a further challenge for their proponents: that of constraining the content of 
attempted deception in a way that generalises across different illocutionary acts. 
 
5.2 Falsity condition 
 
In the literature on lying, virtually every author accepts a ÔsubjectiveÕ account of lying, 
according to which asserting an objectively false proposition is not necessary for lying, 
as long as the speaker believes that proposition to be false25. However, a few authors 
																																																								
25
 Augustine (DM, 3.3), Aquinas (ST, II-II, q.110, a1), Kant (1797), Leonard (1959:182), 
Isenberg (1964:466; 1974), Lindley (1971), Mannison (1969:138), Chisholm & Feehan (1977), 
Kupfer (1982:104), Adler (1997), Williams (2002), Mahon (2008), Fallis (2009). Other authors 
endorse weaker positions. Carson (1982:16; 2006:284; 2010:39) and Saul (2012) provide a 
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(Grotius RWP:1209, Benton forth) have suggested that falsity of the statement, in 
addition to belief in its falsity, is required for lying Ð call this the objective view. 
Recently, Turri & Turri (2015) claimed to have found experimental evidence that most 
laypeople endorse the objective view. However, their study is far from convincing, and 
has recently been dismissed by Wiegmann et al. (2016). An interesting aspect of the 
present study is that it puts further pressure on the objective view of lying, and on Turri 
& TurriÕs claims on the issue. 
Turri & Turri conducted three experiments (A, B, C). Experiment A actually supports 
the subjective view; Turri & Turri challenge its results as possibly primed by 
perspective-taking or normative judgement. Experiment B and C support the objective 
view, but the probes used strike as disputable even to the eye of the non-expert. 
Experiment B tests the participantsÕ intuitions about Ôsuccessfully lyingÕ, and hence can 
hardly be informative about the necessary conditions for lying: by definition, successful 
lying requires more than just lying, and falsity might just be one of such additional 
requirements (Kupfer 1982:104). Similarly, Experiment C forces participants to pick 
between Òhe tried to lie and actually did lieÓ and Òhe tried to lie but only thinks he liedÓ 
Ð thus presupposing the falsity of the subjective view, according to which such 
distinction is meaningless (on the subjective view, if you think you lied, you have lied). 
Wiegmann et al. (2016) offer a more systematic discussion of what is wrong with the 
experiment, and back up their critique with convincing experimental evidence. They 
argue that the results obtained in the second two experiments are due to Òpragmatic re-
interpretations [of the questions,] induced by the framing of the response optionsÓ, and 
demonstrate that the preference for the subjective view disappears once such misleading 
framing is eliminated. All their experiments consistently show that the subjective view 
better tracks laypeopleÕs intuitions about lying, thus dismissing Turri & TurriÕs 
discussion of their results and providing new evidence favouring the subjective view. 
How does the present study relate to this debate? A first suggestion is that if participants 
regarded falsity as necessary for lying, they would not have rated a promise as a lie 
unless the promise was actually infringed in the story. However, in all conditions of all 
experiments participants agreed that the protagonist lied, even if it is always left 
																																																																																																																																																																		
definition that does not require falsity, but both suggest that the definition could be strengthened 
to include such a requirement. Siegler (1966:132) suggests that falsity is necessary for telling a 
lie but not for lying; less controversially, Coleman & Kay (1981:28) argue that falsity is 
necessary for prototypical lying. 
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unspecified whether the promise was fulfilled or not, i.e. if it was objectively false26. 
This seems incompatible with the fact that all respondents in the straightforward 
conditions, and the majority in the others, indicated that Coco lied. Moreover, in the 
straightforward cases, 99% of the participants reported that they found it easy to 
respond. How could this be, if they did not know whether the falsity condition 
obtained? 
One easy response is that in all four cases the respondents predicted that, given the 
information available, the promise would eventually be infringed in the story: they took 
it that it was ÔimplicitÕ that the falsity condition would obtain. This is clearly plausible 
for the straightforward conditions: since Coco intends not to do what he promised, and 
believes that very probably he will succeed in not doing it, the falsity condition will 
almost surely be met. A similar inference is plausible in the no-belief condition: even if 
Coco intends to repair the car, he believes that very likely he will not succeed, and this 
clearly suggests that the car will not be repaired. 
The real problem for proponents of the falsity condition is the no-intention case: here, 
Coco intends to drink against his promise, but he believes that he will very likely fail to 
do so, because he will not be able to. The information provided in the scenario cannot 
license the inference to the conclusion that he will drink; as a matter of fact, it only 
licenses the opposite inference. In other words, not only it is not specified if the falsity 
condition obtains, but the scenario clearly suggests that it will not obtain. In all 
experiments, the no-intention condition was consistently rated as a lie (obtaining even 
higher scores than the other crucial condition), and in no experiment its results were 
significantly different to the straightforward scenarios: this strongly suggests that 
participants did not take falsity of the promise to be necessary for lying. 
																																																								
26
 What do we mean exactly by saying that such a promise about a future state of affairs can be 
false? No straightforward response can be offered in our case, because promises are about future 
contingents (at the moment in which a promise is uttered, it is still indeterminate whether the 
promisor will fulfil it: in some possible futures he does, in others he does not) and semanticists 
disagree about how to determine the truth-conditions of statements about future contingents. 
The fact that we are considering a promise rather than an assertion further complicates the issue. 
However, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to point out that no plausible account is 
able to predict that the falsity condition is met in the no-intention case. Having noted that, it is 
worth offering a sketch of how a plausible characterisation of the falsity condition for promising 
could look like. The following is broadly inspired on BelnapÕs (2000) account of the truth 
conditions for promising that Φ: 
The falsity condition for promising that Φ is met at the moment of the utterance mU and at 
the relevant moment mR (mR ≥ mU) iff it is a settled matter at mR that Φ was false at mU. 
I am grateful to Francesco Gallina for having helped me to develop this point. 
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The experimental data collected thus strengthens the case for the subjective account. As 
already shown by Wiegmann et al., people think that lying does not require falsity after 
all27. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have developed a speech-act theoretic framework to outline the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to lie by promising, and sketched a way to extend 
this account to other illocutionary acts performed by uttering a sentence containing an 
explicit performative. Assuming that an Ôassertion-basedÕ definition of lying is broadly 
correct, the proposed account takes a promise to be a lie under the following conditions: 
 
In uttering a promise with content p, S lies to A about p iff:  
1.! S successfully promises that p 
2.! Either S believes that not p, or S does not intend to p, or both 
 
More generally, the account predicts that the utterance of a given speech act with 
content p is a lie iff that act illocutionarily entails an assertion and the speaker either 
satisfies the insincerity condition of that act, or that of the entailed assertion, or both. 
In presenting this view, I have put into question several ideas that are found in the 
literature: the view that only direct assertions can be lies; the view that the propositional 
content of a lie has to be believed to be false; the view a promise is insincere only if the 
speaker does not intend to perform; the view that falsity is required for lying. The 
experimental study presented in the second part of the work has shown that with respect 
to promises the proposed view, but none of the alternative ones, gives predictions that 
are consistent with folk intuitions about lying.  
Overall, it seems that the proposed theory of lying offers a promising background to 
develop a general theory of the conditions under which the performance of an insincere 
speech act counts as a lying. 
 
Appendix I Ð the scenarios 
 
Drink story - Refraining from action 
																																																								
27
 It should be stressed, however, that the experimental design of this study was not conceived 
specifically to test the falsity condition hypothesis. Even if the data collected supports the 
objective view, it provides weaker support than studies explicitly conceived to test this 
hypothesis, i.e. studies explicitly stated that the falsity condition did not obtain. 
32	
	
 
Baba and Coco are married. Coco is going to a party, but Baba does not like Coco to drink. So 
Baba asks him: ÒWill you be drinking alcohol at the party?Ó. Coco replies: ÒDo not worry Baba: 
I promise that I will not drink alcohol at the party.Ó  
 
Scenario 1 - Straightforward:  
In fact, Coco intends to drink alcohol at the party, and he is almost certain that he will find 
something to drink there.  
 
Scenario 2 - No intention (to refrain as promised): 
Coco actually intends to drink alcohol at the party and he will attempt to, but he is almost 
certain that he wonÕt succeed, since he believes that the hosts do not offer alcoholic drinks at 
their parties.  
 
Repair story - Positive action 
Baba has broken her car, but she needs it to visit her family next week. For this reason, Baba 
has called Coco the mechanic to repair it. Coco the mechanic checks the car and tells Baba: ÒDo 
not worry Baba: I promise that I will repair your car by next week.Ó  
 
Scenario 3 - Straightforward: 
Coco has no intention whatsoever to repair the car, and he is almost certain that he will not 
repair it.  
 
Scenario 4 - No belief: 
Coco intends to repair the car and he will attempt to do it, but he is almost certain that he wonÕt 
manage to repair it in the end, because the damage is too serious.  
 
Appendix II Ð Intentions and beliefs: good intentions and reasonable expectations 
 
This appendix aims to clarify and justify two assumptions that I made in the paper. The first 
(section 3.2) is that it can be rational to intend to do something you believe you will probably 
fail to do, and conversely that it can be rational to believe you will probably end up doing 
something you do not intend to do. The second (section 4.4) is that the rationality constraints 
applying to mental states about doing something are different to the constraints applying to 
mental states about refraining from doing something Ð an asymmetry that is reflected in the 
experimental design. 
The first assumption challenges the cognitivist view that believing that one will successfully Φ 
(not merely believing that one will try to Φ) is necessary for rationally intending to Φ: 
  
COG:  S rationally intends to Φ only if S believes that S will successfully Φ 
  
If COG is right, the entailed-assertion account of the insincerity conditions for promising 
somehow boils down to the only-intention account (cf. section 3.2), as they would provide an 
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equivalent criterion for identifying sincere promises in all cases in which the speaker is 
rational
28
.  
There is a vast literature on the nature of intentions, and no consensus on whether COG is 
true.  Rationally enough, defendants of COG are dubbed cognitivists, its opponents non-
cognitivist. Cognitivists
29
 endorse COG, and claim that it is irrational to intend to do something 
if you do not believe that you will do it: for instance, it is irrational for you to intend to arrive to 
work on time if you believe that you will fail to arrive to work on time.  Non-cognitivists
30
 deny 
COG, and hold that it can be rational to intend to do something even if you believe that there are 
significant chances that you will not do it: under some conditions, it might be rational for me to 
intend to arrive to work on time even if I do not believe that I will succeed. 
This paper endorses a weak form of cognitivism. The aim of this Appendix is to clarify what 
this means, and to spell out the main assumptions of this view Ð by contrast, solving the long-
lasting dispute between cognitivist and non-cognitivism falls well beyond its aim. 
As anticipated in 3.2, it seems possible to intend to Φ even if you believe that you will probably 
fail in Φing, if your belief is partial rather than outright. Cognitivism is undeniable only as long 
as we move within a full-fledged belief framework (Holton 2008, 2009). Once credences 
(degrees of belief) are considered, rather than a binary opposition between believing and not 
believing it is possible to appreciate a number of intermediate cases: you may be certain that 
you will do what you intend to do, be uncertain that you will do it, believe it probable that you 
will do it, etc. In this framework, it is easy to spell out a plausible version of non-cognitivism. 
I take it to be an uncontroversial ÔcognitivistÕ assumption that one cannot rationally intend to do 
something if one is certain that one will not do it. I cannot rationally intend to arrive to work on 
time if I am certain that I will arrive late. So at least the following version of cognitivism seems 
undeniable: 
  
W-COG: S rationally intends to Φ only if S is not certain that S will not successfully Φ 
  
																																																								
28
 It should be noted, however, that COG departs significantly from the rationality constraints 
traditionally imposed on the only-intention condition for promising. Writing on promises, Searle 
explicitly states that an intention to Φ requires believing that Φ is possible (Searle 1965:243), 
but does not mention any further requirements. One can adopt COG and interpret the only-
intention account as indirectly requiring a sincere belief, but such an account would be 
significantly different to (and arguably at odds with) traditional speech-act theoretic views. 
29
 Hampshire & Hart (1958:1-12), Grice (1971:263-79), Audi (1973); Harman (1976:461-463), 
(1989:¤8), Davis (1984), Velleman (1985:33-61; 1989), Setiya (2008:388-409), Ross 2009:238-
282). 
30
 Davidson (1971:50; 1978:91-4; 1980:83-102), Bratman (1987:19-20,37-39; 2009: ¤2), Mele 
(1992: ¤8), Holton (2008:51-55; 2009: ¤2), Hieronymi (2009:201-20), Paul (2009:1-24), 
Sinhababu (2013). 
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This form of is cognitivism only specifies the incompatibility between certainty that you will 
not succeed to Φ and intention to Φ. If one accepts W-COG alone as a criterion for rationally 
intending, one obtains W-COG*: 
 
W-COG*: S can rationally intend to Φ only if S has at least a partial belief that S will successfully Φ 
 
A similar view is defended by Holton (2008:51-55, 2009:49), who claims that you rationally 
intend to Φ only if you take as a live possibility that you will Φ successfully. To put our 
example in his words, it is rational for me to intend to arrive to work on time as long as I take it 
as a live possibility that I will arrive to work on time. Similarly, in the ÔRepair scenarioÕ 
employed in the experiments, Coco takes it as a live possibility that he will repair the car (he is 
not certain that he will fail to repair it), so his intention can be rational. Adopting a rationality 
constraint like W-COG* allows you to rationally promise what you intend to do, even if you do 
not fully believe that you will succeed. 
Conversely, are there intention-based constraints on believing that one will Φ? Is it rational to 
believe that you will Φ if you do not intend to Φ? If the answer is negative, maybe the no-belief 
account can be redeemed, as it would give the same predictions of the no-intention paradigm in 
all cases in which the speaker is rational. 
At first glance, believing that one will Φ does not require intending to Φ. For instance, I may 
believe that I will go to jail, while intending not to go to jail, if I think that the police will 
transport me there in a police van and lock me up.  However, the example is misleading, as Φ 
here does not indicate an intentional action that is willingly brought about by the speaker, and 
this is not what we want to capture with the expression Òintending to ΦÓ. We are interested in 
the rationality of intending to act, and acting requires actively doing something, whereas being 
passively subject to someone elseÕs action does not qualify as acting. 
When I am escorted to jail, I am not actively performing the action of going to jail: I am rather 
passively being brought there. By contrast, if I go to jail against my will because I fear the legal 
consequences of not doing so, I am actively performing the action of going to jail: here I lack 
the desire to go to jail, but not the intention to do it. The jail examples fail to show that you can 
rationally believe that you will Φ without intending to Φ, as long as Φ is taken to be an 
intentional action. They suggest that believing that one will Φ does not require desiring to Φ, 
but does indeed require intending to Φ. This results in the converse of the cognitivist view, 
applied to beliefs: 
  
COG2: S rationally believes that [S will intentionally] Φ only if S intends to Φ 
  
Putative counterexamples to COG2 are cases in which Φ stands for a verb that indicates that S 
refrains from acting Ð what I will call a negative action. Suppose I am on an only-meat diet, but 
I love vegetables. I might believe that I will stick to my only-meat diet and refrain from eating 
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vegetables today, while intending not to refrain from eating vegetables, because I am almost 
certain that I will have no way to get some vegetables to eat. Here the case is analogous to the 
examples supporting weak cognitivism for intentions: it has to do with an intention that cannot 
be achieved because of some conditions (vegetables are not available) that are very likely to 
occur independently of the agent, and that is rational only insofar as the agent is not certain that 
these circumstances will occur (cf. Sinhababu 2013). 
There is a reason for this analogy, and more generally a reason why a Ônegative actionÕ can 
violate COG2 while a Ôpositive actionÕ cannot. The reason is that believing that you will refrain 
from Φ even if you intend not to refrain from Φ can be redescribed as believing that you will 
not Φ while intending to Φ. That is, a case of believing without intending that you will perform 
a negative action can be redescribed a case of intending without believing that you will perform 
a positive action. To see that this is the case, consider again the example: 
 
(Br) I believe that I will refrain from eating vegetables 
is equivalent to 
(B~p) I believe that I will not eat vegetables 
 
(I~r) I intend not to refrain from eating vegetables 
is equivalent to 
(Ip) I intend to eat vegetables 
 
Or, formally, where (ÔrÕ = Ôrefrain from pÕ): 
B(r) = B(~p) 
I(~r) = Ip 
 
(Here (Br)/(I~r) and (B~p)/(Ip) are the pairs of mental states whose rationality is under discussion) 
 
Now, if the conversion from intending without believing into believing without intending is 
based on equivalence, it can also go the other way round, and convert the description of an 
intention-belief pair with a negative-action content into a pair that has a positive-action content. 
This would mean that also positive action cases can be described as cases of intending without 
believing and treated under W-COG*, so that W-COG* can also apply to cases of believing 
without intending. The problem is that once we consider intention-belief pairs with negative 
content, it turns out that W-COG* does not apply to these pairs Ð in other words, that negative 
action cases are a counterexample to W-COG*. To see this, consider the opposite example: 
 
(2Bp) I believe that I will almost certainly eat 
is equivalent to 
(2B~r) I believe that I will almost certainly not refrain from eating 
 
(2I~p) I intend to not eat 
is equivalent to 
(2Ir) I intend to refrain from eating 
 
(Here (2Bp)/(2I~p) and (2B~r)/(2Ir) are the pairs of mental states whose rationality is under 
discussion) 
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That holding both mental states ((2Bp) and (2I~p)) would involve irrationality is quite obvious, 
as predicted by COG2: whenever I intend to refrain from willingly doing something, it is 
entirely up to me whether I will not do that thing, so that I cannot believe that I will not refrain 
if I intend to refrain. 
The moral of this story is that, for all intention-belief pairs, for all intentional actions Φ, weak 
cognitivism (W-COG*) constrains the rationality of oneÕs intention to perform a positive action 
(or oneÕs belief that one will perform a negative action), and strong cognitivism (COG-COG2) 
*) constrains the rationality of oneÕs intention to perform a negative action (or oneÕs belief that 
one will perform a positive action). In other words, if Φ is a positive action, it is rational for you 
to intend to Φ even if you are not certain that you will Φ, but not to believe (to some degree) 
that you will Φ if you intend not to Φ. By contrast, if Φ is a negative action, it is irrational for 
you to intend to Φ even if you are not certain that you will Φ, but it is rational to believe that 
you will (less than certainly) Φ if you intend not to Φ. 
This provides a unified picture of what it is to rationally intend without believing, and to 
rationally believe without intending. From this picture, it follows that a rational speaker can 
insincerely promise to actively do something by violating only the belief sincerity condition, 
and insincerely promise to refrain from doing something by violating only the intention 
sincerity condition. This is a fundamental assumption for this paper, as it explains both the 
importance of the distinction between the belief-insincerity and the intention-insincerity 
conditions (sections 3.2) and the asymmetry in the experimental design (section 4)
 31
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